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Andrea E. Ostheimer 
 
Mozambique’s tainted parliamentary and  
presidential elections (December 2004)1 
 
 
The 1st and 2nd of December 2004, Mozambique’s voters went to the polls in 
the third parliamentary and presidential elections since the introduction of a 
multiparty system and the end of the country’s civil war. Characteristic for 
these elections was a surprisingly low voter turnout of about 36 %. After the 
end of the civil war in 1992, and in its first free multiparty elections, 88 % of 
the electorate participated and demonstrated their support for the peace and 
democratization process. At that point, for most voters, elections symbolized 
the return of peace, and the majority of them expected an improvement of 
their living conditions from the new democratic set-up. In 1998, Mozam-
bique’s democratization process encountered its first set-back when voter 
turnout at the local elections remained as low as 14. 6 %. An election boycott 
by Renamo, a lack of alternatives to Frelimo, the chaotic organization of the 
election itself and an insufficient civic education which failed to explain to 
voters the significance of local elections and its process, were mainly respon-
sible for the high voter abstention. On the other hand, the apathy also indi-
cated the population’s frustration with the failure of the Frelimo government 
to deliver meaningful social services which would improve the living stan-
dards for the majority of Mozambicans. To the contrary, the people faced 
increasing living costs and a deterioration of public services. In 1999, Mozam-
bique’s voters returned to the ballot boxes for the second parliamentary and 
presidential elections. The relatively high turnout of 68.5% bestowed the win-
ners of both elections with sufficient legitimacy. A high level of voter partici-
pation was also expected in 2004, because of the narrow margin of votes 
casted for Frelimo candidate Joaquim Chissano and his Renamo opponent, 
Afonso Dhlakama, in 1999 (difference of 205593 votes). Anticipated was also 
the question whether it would come, for the first time, to the so called „turn-
over test” that according to political scientist Samuel Huntington, has to be 
seen as a criteria for the consolidation of democracy. Election campaigning of 
both major parties but also of the newcomer, the 2003 established „Partido 
pelo Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento” (PDD), was widespread and cov-
                                                 
1   Revised and extended version of a  first assessment of the elections published in German 
by the author on 08.12.2004, cf. www.kas.de/publikationen/2004/5824-dokument. html 
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ered the whole country. However, the campaigns’ character drastically dem-
onstrated the highly polarized nature of Mozambique’s political arena. Strik-
ing for any observer were the individualized campaigns, particularly in urban 
and developed regions. In addition to the party trucks, on which flag waving 
party agents cruised around town, one could see individual cars, windows 
and doors decorated with posters of the presidential candidates Guebuza or 
Dhlakama. SMS were sent around to friends and colleagues advocating to cast 
their votes in favour of a particular candidate. During the 45 days of official 
election campaigning Maputo’s citizens embarked every weekend on endless 
election campaign rallies along the city’s coastal strip – the Marginal. Against 
this vibrant and highly polarized election campaign the low voter turnout 
came as a surprise to observers. It seemed that after having had a good time 
and lots of free beverages during the run-up nobody was further interested to 
deliver their votes and to stand in polling queues for several hours. Despite 
the fact that only 36.3% of the electorate2 participated the turnout was never-
theless higher than in the 2003 local elections (24.61%). Voter apathy and po-
litically disinterested citizens are apparently on the increase in Mozambique. 
This phenomenon affects urban as well as rural areas, strongholds of the op-
position as well as those of the ruling party. 
Although a thorough empirical analysis will be needed to identify the reasons 
behind the high abstention – similarly to that done after the 1998 local elec-
tions3 – certain factors, which probably influenced the voter turnout, need to 
be considered: 
 As the rainy season had already started in some areas peasants in rural 
areas gave priority to the cultivation of their „machambas”. 
 A general and comprehensive new registration process, as was done for 
the 1999 elections, was suspended for financial reasons. Instead voter registers 
were updated in 2003 and 2004; which particularly included first-time voters, 
people who had moved and those who had lost their voter’s card. But also old 
registers of 1999 were used without being revised. Data samples gathered by 
the author at polling stations around the province of Sofala showed that poll-
ing stations with voters’ rolls from 1999 hardly reached a participation level of 
                                                 
2   This percentage was given by the National Electoral Commission (CNE) on the bases of 
an inflated voters roll. According to the Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (INE) the total 
number of citizens of voting age were 9.1 Mio in August 2004. The CNE voters roll, however, 
contains the names of 9 095 185 voters. Taking into consideration the percentage of INE 
estimates for citizens that had reached voting age in 1999 and the percentage who were 
registered then (85%), one could assume, for 2004, that approximately 7.7 Mio. constitute the 
actual electorate. Against this figure approximately 43% might have exercised their right to 
vote and not 36.3% as stated by CNE. [AIM newsletter, http:// 
www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim290.html#story3, accessed 22.12.2004. 
3   Carlos Serra, Eleitorado Incapturável, Maputo 1999. 
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20% whereas polling stations using voters’ lists from 2003/2004 had an aver-
age participation rate of approximately 50%.  
 Although the accumulation of polling stations into polling centers might 
have made sense from an organizer’s perspective, viewed against the logisti-
cal challenges of elections in a country such as Mozambique, it however 
proved detrimental for the participation of citizens in the electoral process. 
Particularly in rural areas the pooling of polling stations resulted in long dis-
tances (up to 20 km)which most voters had to march. In the district of Buzi, 
Sofala province (Guarara polling centre), long walking distances were proba-
bly mainly responsible for the low turnout of 23 voters (from 584 voters regis-
tered) up to the afternoon of the second election day.  
 An additional factor contributing towards voter apathy is the Mozambi-
can electoral law and the political system as such, notably the nomination of 
provincial governors by the President. Large majorities of citizens, who vote 
in their provinces for the opposition, feel excluded from the decision-making 
process. Also the electoral set-up, using provinces as ultra-large constituen-
cies, enhances the gap between Members of Parliament (MPs) and their vot-
ers. Additionally, the „party list system” prevents voters to hold their MPs 
accountable, as their main interest becomes that of the party. Although civil 
society has done a lot of voters education over the last years, a lack of sub-
stantial civic education going beyond the mere explanation of how to vote, 
and highlighting the individual responsibilities of citizens for a consolidation 
of democracy, might have been another factor explaining the widespread 
voter apathy. Despite all positive reports about Mozambique’s development 
one also should not forget that 68.4% of the population are living in absolute 
poverty, and high illiteracy rates amongst women (74.1%) and men (44.6%) 
are limiting popular participation in the political process.  
 
 
Favourable features of the electoral process 
 
Unfortunately it seems that Mozambique’s electoral bodies did not learn from 
the problems and weaknesses of the 1999 process – or even lacked the politi-
cal will to do so. Therefore, problems of the 1999 election, such as the com-
puter tabulation of data sheets coming in from the polling stations, reoc-
curred. Nevertheless, there were also positive aspects in the electoral process 
that merit to be highlighted.  
 In general voting went smoothly on both election days. Controversies 
that occurred, concerning for example the security of ballot boxes after the 
first polling day (should they be guarded jointly by party delegates and the 
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police or only by the police4), were resolved in most cases in consensus among 
all parties concerned. The presence of party delegates from at least three par-
ties (Frelimo, PDD, Renamo) at most polling stations enhanced the transpar-
ency of the voting and the vote-counting process.  
 Also the efforts of well-trained polling station staff explaining, meticu-
lously, the voting procedures to all voters were laudable. In 85% of the ob-
served polling stations no irregularities were reported and the presiding offi-
cers did their job satisfactory. 
Also commendable was the pooling of resources by Mozambican civil society 
and their creation of a national consortium for the monitoring of the elections 
(„Observatório Eleitoral”). Its parallel count based on a sample of 792 polling 
stations (every 16th), bestowed much credibility to an albeit defunct post-
election-process. With national observers and party delegates present at the 
majority of polling stations, transparency was guaranteed, up to the handing 
over of editorial sheets („editais”) containing the individual results to party 
agents.  
Another factor to be mentioned is that Mozambique, particularly in compari-
son with elections held in other countries of the region, possesses albeit not a 
perfect, but a sound electoral law, which regulates even sensitive areas, such 
as election campaign financing (Capítulo III, Art. 35ff, Lei no. 7/2004 de 17 de 
Junho de 2004) and access to the media (Capítulo II, Art. 29ff, Lei no. 7/2004 
de 17 de Junho de 2004). 
 
 
Negative aspects of the election process 
 
An unprofessional and chaotic organization of the elections became already 
apparent during the two election days. Voters’ registers („cadernos”) consti-
tuted one of the most serious problems. Some of them had been sent to the 
wrong polling stations. Some voters had valid voter’s cards but were, how-
ever, not listed in the registers. Voters’ numbers and names showed inconsis-
tencies, and names in voters’ lists but without registration numbers occurred 
frequently. In some cases the presiding officers reached consensus with party 
agents present and decided in favour of the citizen who had come to vote. 
However, in other cases voters remained excluded from the political process 
                                                 
4   The Mozambican police (PRM) have the reputation to be closely associated with the 
ruling party as an integration of demobilized Renamo soldiers into PRM never took place. 
Particularly under the rule of Samora Machel the police forces were used as a political in-
strument, and the author found a poster still hanging on the walls of the Buzi district police 
command from Samora’s times, stating that the police is the political agent of the party and 
the state.   
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due to errors and omissions in the preparation of the elections. Particularly in 
those districts considered as opposition strong-holds (on the Ilha de Moçam-
bique, for example, two „cadernos” never turned up5) disappearing voters 
rolls posed serious questions. Some of these problems referred to had already 
occurred in the 2003 local elections and their negative impacts on the electoral 
process were highlighted by the Carter Center after the local elections, as well 
as after the registration up-date in 2004.6  
 At close scrutiny of the available statistical data of the voting age popu-
lation it was evident even before the elections that the voter’s roll contained 
double registrations.  Voters who had already passed away were never taken 
off the roll. Particularly on provincial levels this became problematic, as the 
allocation of parliamentary seats was done on the bases of registered voters. 
 A serious omission for the transparency of the process had been the 
non-availability of a final polling station list with registration book numbers 
and the amount of registered voters. What has been declared as „state secret” 
by the CNE, would have been a valid instrument for observers and political 
parties to see how polling stations were allocated, and to assess whether this 
corresponded with the data contained in the tabulation software.7 
 Logistical problems with the distribution of election material – increased 
by the early rainy season – reduced the elections to only one day in remote 
areas of Gaza, Niassa and the province of Tete. Ten polling stations in Cabo 
Delgado and an additional 33 in the district of Milange (Zambezia province) 
remained entirely closed due to heavy rainfall. Thus approximately 24,943 
voters were excluded.8 As logistical problems are still common in a develop-
ing country with a desolate infrastructure, such as in Mozambique, the ques-
tion arises whether delays or even non-opening of polling stations could have 
been avoided, and to what extent deviations of priorities in resource alloca-
tion from opposition strongholds could have been noticed. The EU Observer 
Mission explicitly mentioned the inadequate and last minute planning by the 
Technical Secretariat for the Administration of Elections (STAE) and the CNE, 
and chief observer Javier Pomes harshly criticized that the CNE could have 
done much better, but failed to make good use of the time, money and exper-
tise which were available.9 
                                                 
5   Observation by EISA Mission Observer.  
6   Carter Center, The Carter Center Report on the Mozambique Voter Registration Update, 
June 28-July 15 2004, Atlanta/Maputo, September 2004. 
7   Carter Center, Postelection Statement on Mozambique Elections, Dec. 21, 2004; 
<www.cartercenter.org>, accessed 08.12.2004. 
8   “About 25 000 Mozambicans were disenfranchised”, in: AIM News Maputo, 07.12.2004. 
9   EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Mozambique – 2004, Second Preliminary 
Statement, Maputo 20 December 2004. www.eueomm.org./statement2, accessed 03.01.2005; 
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The politicized electoral commission definitely constituted an obstacle to the 
transparency and credibility of the electoral process. On the base of their seat 
allocation in parliament, Frelimo and Renamo appoint 10 and 8 members 
respectively. Since 2003 the President of CNE will be proposed by civil society 
and elected by CNE party members. Although the inclusion of civil society 
was a first step in the right direction, the majority of the ruling party within 
the CNE impeded an atmosphere of trust and cooperation, particularly on a 
national level. An independent and depoliticized CNE (e.g. as in South Af-
rica) could reduce the existing mistrust, speed up the decision-making process 
by fostering consensus, and thereby could enhance the credibility of the elec-
toral process in society. 
 Prior to the elections a lot of suspicion was created concerning the tabu-
lation of votes and the access of national and international observers to this 
stage of the process. Problematic in 1999 and one of the points that Renamo 
had taken up as fraudulent, international observers continued to insist before 
the elections, that observation should cover all phases of the process including 
the tabulation of votes. Official statements by CNE before the elections, deny-
ing access to observers were later revised. CNE’s final decision after the elec-
tion days to restrict access to the tabulation proceedings to half an hour daily, 
created and enhanced an atmosphere of distrust.10  Election observers, from 
the EU and the Carter Center, stressed that „the process suffered from nu-
merous errors and insufficiencies arising from the software used and inade-
quate training of staff.“11 The provisory tabulation of results started only five 
days after polling stations were closed and remained hampered due to techni-
cal software problems. The computer software itself proved to be problematic, 
as it was a homemade product of STAE which in a last-minute audit ( an 
auditor report was submitted to CNE on 26.11.) showed severe security risks 
of which not all could be eliminated before the elections.12 The appearance of 
about 556 extra tally sheets due to software errors not only confused observ-
ers and political parties, but also constituted a fertile ground for fraud.13 
                                                                                                               
AWEPA, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, 2004 election special issue 30 – 20 Decem-
ber 2004. 
10   Exchange of information with Member of Commonwealth Observer Group, Maputo 
20.12.2004. 
11   EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Mozambique – 2004, Second Preliminary 
Statement, Maputo 20 December 2004. www.eueomm.org./statement2, accessed 03.01.2005. 
12   AWEPA, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, No. 31 – 29.12.2004 and No. 20 – 9 
December 2004. 
13   Carter Center, Postelection Statement on Mozambique Elections, Dec. 21, 2004; 
www.cartercenter.org; accessed 08.12.2004; AWEPA, 2004 Election Special Issue 21 – 10 
December 2004. 
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The re-assessment of invalid and contested votes could only be observed within 
allocated time slots - a procedure that additionally raised questions about its 
secret character. 
 
 
Incidents of irregularities 
 
Observers of the post-election phase reported tally sheets („editais“) with  
unrealistically high voter turnouts. These occurred mainly in the provinces of 
Niassa, Tete and Gaza where polling stations showed a 100% turnout (against 
30 to 40% on a national level) and a 90% support for Frelimo.14 As it was 
mainly in those areas where party agents were denied credentials, where 
observers encountered problems getting access to information, and opposi-
tion campaigners were intimidated prior to the elections, it seems very likely 
that ballot boxes got stuffed here in favour of the ruling party. During the re-
classification of invalid ballots it could also be noticed that a high number of 
invalid ballot papers were recorded particularly from the provinces of Niassa 
and Tete, showing „consistent patterns of additional ink marks that were 
mostly seen on ballots that would have otherwise been for Renamo.”15 
 
 
The final results  
  
On the bases of their parallel counts conducted immediately after the polling 
stations were closed, both „Radio Moçambique” and „Observatório Eleitoral” 
forecasted an overwhelming victory by Frelimo.  As the final results were 
announced by the Chairperson of the CNE, Arão Litsuri on 21st of December 
(four days after the legal deadline), they were then of no surprise. According 
to the CNE Frelimo won the Parliamentary elections with 62.03% of the 3 321 
926 votes cast against 29.73% gained by Renamo and 2.00% for the PDD. In 
Mozambique only those parties with a minimum of 5% of the national votes 
are allocated seats in parliament. Therefore, once again Frelimo and the elec-
toral alliance Renamo-União Eleitoral share the cake.  
                                                 
14   EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Mozambique-2004, op.cit. 
15   Carter Center, Postelection Statement on Mozambique Elections, Dec. 21, 2004, op. cit. 
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Legislative parliamentary elections 2004 
 
 
Tab. 1: Seat distribution according to provinces  
             (with 1999 figures in brackets): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Province Seats  
to be dis- 
tributed 
 
Frelimo No. of 
votes for 
Frelimo 
Renamo No. of 
votes for 
Renamo 
Niassa 12 (13) 9 (6) 92,871 3 (7) 39,267 
Cabo Delga-
do 
22 (22) 18 (16) 207,936 4 (6) 48,408 
Nampula 50 (50) 27 (24) 210,942 23 (26) 177,275 
Zambezia 48 (49) 19 (15) 150,318 29 (34) 220,724 
Tete 18 (18) 14 (8) 249,397 4 (10) 72,911 
Manica 14 (15) 7 (5) 87,114 7 (10) 86,942 
Sofala 22 (21) 6 (4) 71,668 18 (17) 183,787 
Inhambane 16 (17) 15 (13) 129,391 1 (4) 16,831 
Gaza 17 (16) 17 (16) 291,729 0 (0) 5,460 
Maputo 
Province 
13 (13) 12 (12) 164,551 1 (1) 16,888 
Maputo City 16 (16) 14 (14) 209,590 2 (2) 34,717 
Emigrants  1 (0)/ 1(0) 1(0)/1(0) 23,547 0 (0)/0(0) 2,079 
TOTAL 250 (250) 160 (133) 1,889,054 90 (117) 905,289 
 
Source: http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim290.html#story3, 
accessed 22.12.2004 ; AWEPA, 2004 Election Special Issue No 34, 5 January 2005.  
 
Looking at the absolute figures, it was striking, how well Frelimo managed to 
keep up its support. With 1 889,055 in the 2004 election Frelimo only ran short 
of 115,648 votes compared to the 1999 result of 2,005,703 votes. Also Guebuza 
did well with 2 004 227 as successor of Joaquim Chissano who in 1999 won 2 
336 333 votes. In the end, Frelimo candidate Armando Guebuza succeeded 
with 63.74% of the valid votes over his Renamo-UE opponent, Afonso 
Dhlakama (31.74%). Raul Domingos, presidential candidate of the newcomer 
PDD, came third with 2.73%.16 
 
 
 
                                                 
16   <http://www.imensis.co.mz/news/anmviewer.asp?a=3154&print:>; accessed 22.12.2004. 
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Tab. 2: Presidential election results: 
 
 
Province Guebuza % of valid Dhlakama % of valid  
 
Niassa 93,711 67.3 39,390 28.3 
Cabo Delgado 212,980 77.6 49,340 18.0 
Nampula 224,206 49.8 197,815 44.0 
Zambezia 162,142 37.5 245,826 56.8 
Tete 256,070 74.2 76,464 22.2 
Manica 92,113 47.4 92,161 47.5 
Sofala 75,691 26.1 198,809  68.5 
Inhambane 142,729 83.7 18,139 10.6 
Gaza 304,562 96.4 5,611 1.8 
Maputo Pro-
vince 
184,475 89.2 17,782 8.6 
Maputo City 217,337 85.2 32,845 12.9 
Africa 24,061 90.6 1,925 7.3 
Europe 535 76.5 149 21.3 
Total 1,990,612 64.2 976,256 31.5 
Requalified 13,614 31.9 21,803 51.1 
TOTAL 2,004,226 63.7 998,059 31.7 
Source: I Ruigrok, Mozambique’s 2004 General Elections, ISS Situation Report, 3 February 
2005, p. 2. 
 
 
The reaction of the opposition 
 
Even before the final results were published, Renamo, a number of the 
smaller parties and the presidential candidates Yussuf Jacob Sibindy and 
Carlos Reis called for the annulment of the elections and submitted their 
„Maputo declaration” containing issues of alleged fraud to representatives of 
the donor community on December 14.17 
                                                 
17   According to that statement which was not shared by PDD, 
• „the registration earlier this year was ‘intentionally deficient’ and excluded large numbers 
of opposition supporters, there were still many errors and omissions in registration books 
and people could not vote,  
• on the night of 1-2 December police did not allow opposition delegates to sleep with the 
ballot boxes in some districts in Tete, Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Gaza. Frelimo came in the 
night and swapped the ballot boxes for different ones containing votes for Guebuza instead 
of Dhlakama 
• police were too close to polling stations and frightened voters, 
• many polling stations opened late or not at all, 
• he tabulation software is not credible, 
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Despite foreign and local advice to accept the results, Dhlakama, the Renamo 
candidate, continued his obstructive stance, known from past elections, even 
after the official announcement of the final results. He demanded an interim 
government until new elections were held in September 2005 and stated that 
he would refuse to accept the seat in the new council of state reserved for the 
leader of the official opposition. Equally, all 90 Renamo deputies would refuse 
to take up their seats in parliament18 
 Finally, however, Renamo’s National Council again changed its mind 
and suggested instead that elections would need not to be re-run in the entire 
country but only in those constituencies where irregularities were detected. It 
was however unclear whether the party was defining the term constituency 
according to the electoral law meaning that elections would have to be re-
peated in entire provinces or whether they were referring to those polling 
stations where irregularities had occurred.19 Renamo submitted its case to the 
Conselho Constitucional, the highest authority to decide on the discrepancies 
and the alleged fraudulent practices. In its judgement on January 15th, the 
Conselho Constitucional rejected the Renamo-UE complaints on procedural 
grounds. The Conselho Constitucional, although highlighting weaknesses of 
the electoral process (such as the lack of a national voter register, insufficient 
knowledge of the electoral legislation on the side of political parties, etc.), 
endorsed the final results published by the CNE and argued that irregularities 
observed finally did not have changed the electoral outcome. While this might 
be true for the presidential elections, it certainly can be assumed that stuffed 
ballot boxes, tally sheets full of errors, and the admitted exclusion of 674 poll-
ing stations from the parliamentary count without any explanation given by 
CNE20, might have deprived the opposition of at least two to three seats in 
parliament.21 
                                                                                                               
• votes for opposition presidential candidates were marked by polling station staff to make 
them valid, and most nulos [invalid votes] are actually votes for Dhlakama, 
• the abstention was because people felt threatened by the ‘secret police’ and were too afraid 
to vote.” (AWEPA, 26 – 15 December 2004) 
Interestingly, Renamo’s spokesperson Antonio Eduardo Namburete even admitted at an 
academic roundtable in Maputo that „Renamo’s protests and claims of fraud in 1994 and 
1999 had no proof. We must accept that. But this year is different.” (AWEPA, 27 – 16 Decem-
ber 2004). 
18   „Increasingly isolated, Dhlakama reaffirms boycott”, in: AIM News, Maputo 23 Decem-
ber 2004. 
19   „Renamo national council rejects elections results”, in: AIM News, Maputo 11 January 
2005. 
20   AWEPA, 2004 Election Special Issue No 33, 3 January 2005. 
21   „Election Irregularities do not change the result”, in: AIM News Maputo, 21 December 
2004. 
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Perils and challenges of  Frelimo continuity 
 
Frelimo received in these elections a comfortable majority which strengthened 
its hegemony further. Counterbalancing and constructive actors with signifi-
cant weight in the political arena are not visible on the horizon, yet, and, in 
addition, the political institutions that could provide the necessary checks and 
balances within the system remain weak. Mozambique’s political landscape, 
after these elections, is endangered to enter again into a vicious circle of an 
overwhelming one-party dominance with all its unfavourable implications for 
democracy.  
 A one party dominant system tends to respond increasingly less to public 
opinions as the governing party can be assured of its re-election. Quite often 
the political process in party dominant systems is characterized by a dissolv-
ing boundary between party and state – a phenomenon which is already ap-
parent in Mozambique’s state administration since independence and which 
might again become reinforced. This in itself has the side effect of reducing 
the likely formation of independent groups within civil society who are and 
remain autonomous from the ruling party. Besides, the growing preponder-
ance of political power facilitates the abuse of office and fosters arbitrary deci-
sion-making that undermines the integrity of democratic institutions. Particu-
larly the proper functioning of the legislature and its ability to check on the 
executive that has been weak in Mozambique so far, runs the risk to be fur-
ther trimmed down.22 Society’s continuation or cessation of support for the 
dominant party is also determined by its perception of the opposition and its 
identity, strategy and actions. However, one-party dominance openly forces 
the opposition to develop strategies and policies in response to the dominant 
ruling party and not necessarily in the redesign of their own political profile.  
 Lack of professionalism of electoral bodies, their partisan character due 
to their politicization and ruling party dominance, non-transparent decision-
making practices of the CNE, its unwillingness to admit mistakes and short-
comings as well as the occurrence of evident fraudulent practices are factors 
which increase the stains on Mozambique’s electoral and democratic  proc-
ess.23 Although the highlighted shortcomings and irregularities did not make 
an impact on the overall election results in the end, and Renamo will not be 
able to claim, as they did in 1999, that they were deprived of their victory by 
                                                 
22   Giliomee, H. and Simkins, C. (Eds.) (1999): The Awkward Embrace; One Party-
Domination and Democracy, Tafelberg, Cape Town. 
23   For an indepth analyses of Mozambique’s democratization process see: A Lala/AE 
Ostheimer, 2003, How to remove the stains on Mozambique’s democratic track record: 
Challenges for the democratization process between 1999-2003, Maputo. 
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fraud, the 2004 elections nevertheless leave behind a bitter aftertaste for ob-
servers of Mozambique’s democratization process. It became evident in these 
elections, even with Renamo increasingly loosing support, that the political 
arena still remains bipolarised. As in the 2003 local elections, the low voter 
turnout favoured the ruling party as Frelimo still managed to sufficiently 
mobilize their core supporters. But Mozambique’s latest elections also dem-
onstrated –considering the small margin between Frelimo and Renamo in 
1999 – that Renamo is not perceived as a credible governmental alternative. 
Instead the growing dissatisfaction of Mozambicans with the Frelimo gov-
ernment transforms into the silent protest of voter abstention. 
 
 
References  
 
AWEPA, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, 2004 Election Special Issue 20 – 9 December 
2004. 
AWEPA, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, 2004 Election Special Issue 21 – 10 Decem-
ber 2004. 
AWEPA, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, 2004 Election Special Issue 26 – 15 Decem-
ber 2004. 
AWEPA, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, 2004 Election Special Issue 27 – 16 Decem-
ber 2004. 
AWEPA, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, 2004 Election Special Issue 30 – 20 Decem-
ber 2004. 
AWEPA, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, 2004 Election Special Issue 31 – 29 Decem-
ber 2004 
AWEPA, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, 2004 Election Special Issue 33, 3 January 
2005. 
AWEPA, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, 2004 Election Special Issue 34, 5 January 
2005 
„Election Irregularities do not change the result”, in: AIM News,  Maputo, 21 December 2004. 
„Increasingly isolated, Dhlakama reaffirms boycott”, in: AIM News, Maputo 23 December 
2004. 
Carter Center, The Carter Center Report on the Mozambique Voter Registration Update, 
June 28-July 15 2004, Atlanta/Maputo, September 2004. 
Carter Center, Postelection Statement on Mozambique Elections, Dec. 21, 2004; 
www.cartercenter.org; accessed 08.12.2004 
Carter Center, Postelection Statement on Mozambique Elections, jan. 26, 2005. 
www.cartercenter.org; accessed 25.02.2005 
EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Mozambique – 2004, Second Preliminary State-
ment, Maputo 20 December 2004. www.eueomm.org./statement2, accessed 03.01.2005. 
http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim290.html#story3, accessed 
22.12.2004 
http://www.imensis.co.mz/news/anmviewer.asp?a=3154&print:; accessed 22.12.2004. 
 
Mozambique’s tainted parliamentary and presidential elections 
 
 
137
 
Giliomee, H and Simkins, C. (eds), 1999. The Awkward Embrace; One Party-Domination and 
Democracy , Tafelberg, Cape Town. 
Lala, A/ Ostheimer, A, 2003, How to remove the stains on Mozambique’s democratic track 
record: Challenges for the democratization process between 1999-2003, Maputo. 
Ruigrok, I, 2005, Mozambique’s 2004 General Elections, ISS Situation Report, 3 February 
2005. 
Serra, C, 1999, Eleitorado Incapturável, Maputo. 
 
 
Recommended literature on Mozambique 
 
De Brito, L , 2003, Sistema eleitoral e conflito em Moçambique, paper presented at the 
EISA/CEDE conference entitled, Consolidating peace and democracy in Mozambique 
through election-related conflict management initiatives, Maputo 22-23 July 2003. 
Carbone, GM, 2003, Emerging pluralist politics in Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo party 
system, Working Paper 23, Development Research Centre, LSE, www. crisis-
states.com/download/wp/WP23GC.pdf. 
Pereira, JGC/Davids, YD/Mattes, R, 2003, Mozambicans’ view of democracy and political 
reform: A comparative perspective, Afrobarometer Paper No. 22, 
www.afrobarometer.org. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dr. Andrea Ostheimer currently works as Acting Resident Representative of the Konrad-
Adenauer-Foundation in South Africa. Between 27.11.-06.12.2004 she had been a member of 
the EISA Electoral Observer Mission to Mozambique and observed the elections in five 
districts of Sofala province (visiting 43 polling stations in the districts of Cheringoma, 
Muanza, Dondo, Beira and Buzi). The author wrote the present article in her personal capac-
ity as a political scientist. It does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Konrad-Adenauer-
Foundation. 
 
